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Metamorphic testing (MT) can enhance security testing by providing an 
alternative to using a testing oracle, which is often unavailable or impractical. 
The authors report how MT detected previously unknown bugs in real-world 
critical applications such as code obfuscators, giving evidence that software 
testing requires diverse perspectives to achieve greater cybersecurity. 
	
Deploying	inadequately	tested	software	can	have	serious	consequences	for	Internet	and	systems	security,	
potentially	 resulting	 in	 “cyberspace	 catastrophes”.[1]	 To	 avoid	 these	effects,	 testers	must	 adopt	 smarter	








because	 testing	with	 this	 type	 of	 input	 often	means	 that	 the	 outputs	 are	 unpredictable	 or	 expensive	 to	
verify.	Worse	still,	resource	constraints	might	mean	that	testers	skip	negative	testing,	potentially	allowing	
security	holes	to	persist	into	the	released	software.[1],[4]	




up	 test	 cases	by	 referring	 to	 selected	MRs,	and	 further	 test	 the	PUT	automatically.	Because	MT	 looks	at	



















Effects of the Oracle Problem 
The	testing	of	certificate-validation	 logic	 in	SSL/TLS	 implementations	 illustrates	the	dilemma	caused	by	
the	 oracle	 problem.[3]	 If	 the	 PUT	 accepts	 a	 nontrivial	 test	 certificate,	 how	 can	 testers	 be	 sure	 that	 it	 is	
indeed	valid?	 If	 the	PUT	 rejects	 the	 certificate,	how	can	 they	 know	whether	or	not	 the	 reason	given	 for	
rejection	is	actually	correct?	As	some	researchers	point	out,	determining	test-certificate	validity	manually	is	
not	 practical	 in	 large-scale	 testing,	 and	 automating	 the	 procedure	 “essentially	 requires	 reimplementing	
certificate	validation,	which	is	impractical	and	has	high	potential	for	bugs	of	its	own.”[3]		
In	 their	work	 on	 testing	 certificate-validation	 logic,[3]	 the	 researchers	 obtained	 several	 independently	
implemented	programs	for	X.509	certificate	validation,	and	could	thus	compare	the	programs’	outputs	for	
the	same	 input	certificates	and	note	any	discrepancies.	However,	even	 if	discrepancies	were	detected,	 it	
might	not	be	easy	 to	know	which	program	 is	 correct—actually,	 all	programs	could	be	 incorrect.	 In	 some	
situations,	multiple	implementations	of	the	same	specification	cannot	be	obtained,	and	the	oracle	problem	
becomes	more	 serious.	 In	 code	 obfuscator	 testing,	 for	 example,	 the	 tester	must	 determine	 if	 the	 input	
(original)	code	and	the	output	(obfuscated)	code	are	equivalent,	which	can	be	extremely	difficult.	
The	 oracle	 problem	 also	 discourages	 testers	 from	 attempting	 fuzz	 testing,	 or	 fuzzing—an	 important	




The	oracle	problem	 is	a	major	challenge	 for	 fuzzing	because	verifying	 the	output	 for	 large	amounts	of	
random	 or	 semirandom	 input	 data	 is	 extremely	 difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible.	 Rather	 than	 attempt	 this	
verification,	 fuzzing	 looks	 only	 for	 crashes	 or	 some	other	 undesirable	 PUT	behavior,	 and	millions	 of	 test	
cases	might	be	executed	before	a	crash.[4]	Moreover,	many	bugs	such	as	logic	errors[5]	do	not	crash	the	
PUT,	 but	 instead	 produce	 incorrect	 output—a	 failure	 type	 that	 is	 much	 more	 difficult	 to	 detect.	 The	
notorious	 Heartbleed	 bug,[1]	 for	 example,	 does	 not	 cause	 a	 crash	 and	 is	 therefore	 undetectable	 with	
simple	fuzzing.[4]	




case,	tʹ	=	180	−	32.875.	After	taking	rounding	errors	 into	consideration,	 if	 the	two	outputs	are	not	equal,	
then	MT	has	revealed	a	failure.		
The	 detection	 of	 compiler	 bugs	 is	 an	 example	 of	 MT	 application.	 Compiler	 correctness	 is	 extremely	
important	because	some	of	the	programs	being	compiled	might	perform	critical	functions.	Researchers	at	






arbitrary	 input	 I,	 record	code-coverage	 information	with	respect	 to	P,	and	create	Pʹ	by	randomly	pruning	
some	 unexecuted	 statements	 from	P.	 A	 compiler	 bug	 is	 reported	 if	 the	 output	 of	Oʹ	 on	 I	 has	 changed.	
Researchers	documented	147	confirmed,	unique	bug	reports	for	GCC	and	LLVM	alone.[13]		














• Obfuscator-LLVM	 (https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator/wiki)	 is	 an	 open	 source	
tool	 in	 the	 LLVM	 compilation	 suite.	 Given	 a	 C	 source	 program,	 Obfuscator-LLVM	 outputs	
obfuscated	and	compiled	binary	code.	Obfuscator-LLVM	users	include	Adobe	Systems,	Apple,	
Intel,	and	Sony.		





obfuscated	 versions	 (O(P1)	 and	O(P2))	 will	 also	 be	 functionally	 equivalent	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 compiled	
obfuscated	 executable	 programs,	 C(O(P1))	 and	 C(O(P2)),	 should	 have	 equivalent	 behavior—the	 same	
outputs	for	the	same	inputs.	
Testing	based	on	 this	MR	 required	generating	equivalent	 source	programs	P1	 and	P2	either	by	using	a	
separate	tool,	such	as	a	script	written	by	the	tester,	or	by	using	the	obfuscator	itself.	We	denoted	the	first	
strategy	by	MR1.1	and	the	second	by	MR1.2.	For	one	MR1.1,		we	defined		P1	as	If (condition) {do A} else {do B}	and	













check	 if	 outputs	 are	 consistent.	 For	 example,	 if	 a	 variable	name	 in	program	P	was	obfuscated	when	 the	
obfuscator	 ran	 yesterday,	 then	 the	 same	 variable	 name	 should	 still	 become	 obfuscated	 when	 the	
obfuscator	is	run	today.	




the	 obfuscated	 source	 code,	 so	 MR1.2	 and	 MR3	 are	 not	 applicable	 to	 its	 testing.)	 We	 also	 found	 that	
different	MRs	detected	different	kinds	of	issues;	for	brevity,	we	describe	only	one	issue	for	each	MR.		
MR1.1.	 Figure	 1	 shows	 excerpts	 of	 input	 files	 that	 revealed	 a	 failure	 in	 Tigress	 (version:	 Linux	 x86_64-
unstable	 revision	1676)	when	tested	against	 this	MR.	The	 test	case,	P1,	has	 two	 integer	variables	 i	and	 j,	
each	of	which	is	assigned	an	initial	value.	If	i	is	greater	than	j	then	i	is	set	to	i	−	10,	otherwise	i	is	set	to	i	+	
10.	Finally,	the	value	of	i	is	printed.	The	upper	left	box	of	Figure	1	shows	the	essential	part	of	the	P1	code.	
The	corresponding	code	of	an	equivalent	program	P2	 (the	 follow-up	 test	 case)	 is	 shown	 in	 the	 lower	 left	
box.	O(P1)	and	O(P2)	are	the	obfuscated	codes	of	P1	and	P2,	the	essential	parts	of	which	appear	in	the	upper	





Figure	 1.	 Tigress	 failure	 detected	 against	 metamorphic	 relation	 (MR)	 MR1.1.	 P1	 and	 P2	 were	 the	
metamorphic	 testing	 (MT)	 test	 cases,	which	were	obfuscated	 into	O(P1)	 and	O(P2).	After	 compiling	O(P1)	
and	 O(P2),	 and	 running	 the	 executable	 programs	 on	 the	 same	 input,	 MT	 detected	 differences	 in	 the	
outputs,	which	signaled	a	bug.	
	
As	Figure	1	shows,	Tigress	incorrectly	obfuscated	the	P1	statement	if (i > j)	into	the	O(P1)	statement	if ((int 
)((i > (long )j + 116) − 116)).	In	C,	the	expression	(i > (long )j + 116)	is	evaluated	to	either	true	(1)	or	false	(0),	so	the	
expression	((i > (long )j + 116) − 116)	 is	evaluated	to	either	−115	or	−116,	both	of	which	are	nonzero.	In	C,	any	
nonzero	value	means	true.	Consequently,	the	if statement	of	O(P1)	will	always	take	the	true	branch,	and	the	
false	branch	will	be	unreachable,	which	means	that	O(P1)	is	not	equivalent	to	P1.	Likewise,	the	false	branch	
of	O(P2)	will	 also	be	unreachable.	When	 testing	against	MR1.1,	we	 ran	C(O(P1))	and	C(O(P2))	on	 the	 same	
input—i	=	j	=1,000.	After	the	if	statement,	C(O(P1))	set	i	to	i	–	10,	(that	is,	990),	but	C(O(P2))	set	it	to	i	+	10	
(that	 is,	 1,010),	 thus	 generating	 different	 outputs.	 As	 a	 result,	 testing	 against	 MR1.1	 revealed	 a	 bug	 in	
Tigress.		





less	 than	 or	 equal	 to	 j’s	 initial	 value.	 In	 contrast,	MT	 guarantees	 bug	 detection	 because	 the	 outputs	 of	
C(O(P1))	and	C(O(P2))	will	always	be	different	regardless	of	these	initial	values.	 In	this	example,	therefore,	
MT	 appears	 superior	 to	 conventional	 testing	 methods,	 emphasizing	 the	 need	 to	 test	 from	 diverse	
perspectives.	
MR1.2.	To	test	Cobfusc	(package	cutils	version	1.6),	we	ran	source	test	case	P1,	which	included	the	statement		
int k = 20; //Rz5Wq3OCvuqsA30uaEY0Evc95AIn		
We	 then	 recursively	 called	 Cobfusc	 to	 construct	 P2	 as	 O(O(P1)).	 We	 expected	 O(P1)	 and	 O(P2)	 to	 be	
equivalent,	 but	 surprisingly,	 O(P2)	 could	 not	 pass	 through	 the	 compiler	 because	 the	 obfuscator	 had	
incorrectly	moved	the	comment	Rz5Wq3OCvuqsA30uaEY0Evc95AIn	from	its	original	line	into	a	separate	new	line	
without	the	//	:	
int k = ((5*(1*1+0)+2)*((2*(1*1+0)+0)*(1*(1*1+0)+0)+0)+(3*(2*1+0)+0)); // 
Rz5Wq3OCvuqsA30uaEY0Evc95AIn 
Thus,	MR1.2	had	detected	a	bug	in	Cobfusc.	
MR2.	 MR2	 states	 that,	 when	 an	 obfuscator	 runs	 at	 different	 times	 for	 the	 same	 program,	 the	 output	
programs	should	be	equivalent.	Given	 a	 C	 source	 program,	 Obfuscator-LLVM	 can	 be	 enabled	 by	 running	
Clang,	LLVM’s	front	end	compiler,	to	obtain	obfuscated	and	compiled	binary	code.	In	Figure	2a,	line	1	shows	
a	 source	 program	 PBP.c	 compiled	 by	 Clang	 with	 command	 line	 parameters	 enabling	 obfuscation.	 The	
compiled	obfuscated	executable	program	(a.out)	was	 run	 in	 line	2	with	an	 input	of	10000022,	producing	
the	 output	 10000022	 in	 line	 3.	 Figure	 2a	 shows	 a	 behavioral	 inconsistency	 in	 the	 compiled	 obfuscated	
executable	programs,	which	produced	an	output	of	10000022	in	lines	3	and	9,	and	14195494	in	line	6,	with	
the	same	procedure	of	obfuscation,	compilation,	and	execution.		Figure	2b	shows	that	when	Clang	was	run	









and	 5),	 the	 output	was	 14195494	 in	 line	 6.	 In	 (b),	 Clang	 consistently	 produced	 an	 output	 of	 14195494.	
(Results	are	from	Obfuscator	LLVM	version	3.4)	
	
The	issue	was	caused	by	five	PBP.c	statements:	 int i; int j; i=atoi(argv[1]); i=i+j; printf("%d\n",i); i	is	initialized	with	
the	 input	 value	 (10000022	 in	 Figure	 2)	 and	 then	 updated	 by	 the	 statement	 i=i+j;—j	 is	 used	 without	
initialization	and,	therefore,	the	value	of	i	after	this	statement	cannot	be	predicted.	This	value	of	i	is	printed	
by	the	printf	statement.	Figure	2a	does	not	indicate	whether	the	output	10000022	or	14195494	is	wrong,	but	




We	 further	 investigated	 this	 issue	 by	 again	 using	 Clang	 to	 compile	 PBP.c	 but	 without	 enabling	 the	




an	 excerpt	 of	 the	 source	 code	 before	 obfuscation;	 Figures	 3b	 and	 3c	 show	 an	 inconsistency	 in	 the	















users’	 account	 settings	 are	 standard.	 During	 testing,	we	 automatically	 captured	 screenshots	 of	 different	






















MT and Negative Testing 
MT	has	considerable	potential	 to	guide	negative	 testing	 to	detect	security	vulnerabilities.	To	explore	 this	
idea,	we	used	MT	to	detect	the	infamous	Heartbleed	bug.		
The Heartbleed bug 
The	Heartbleed	bug	is	probably	the	most	widely	known	cybersecurity	breach	in	recent	years,[1]	appearing	
in	 the	 OpenSSL	 implementation	 of	 the	 Transport	 Layer	 Security	 (TLS)	 and	 Datagram	 Transport	 Layer	
Security	 (DTLS)	 Heartbeat	 Extension	 specified	 in	 RFC	 6520.	 As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 5,	 a	 Heartbeat	 protocol	
message	 consists	 of	 type,	 payload,	 padding,	 and	 payload_length,	 with	 the	 statement	 opaque 
payload[HeartbeatMessage.payload_length];	 meaning	 that	 the	 actual	 payload	 length	must	 equal	 payload_length.	 When	
implementing	this	protocol,	the	programmer	assumed	that	the	relationship	between	payload	and	payload_length	
would	 always	 hold	 true	 and	 therefore	 did	 not	 include	 any	 bounds-checking	 code.	 The	 core	 OpenSSL	






for	 guiding	 negative	 testing	 to	 verify	 implementations	 of	 security-related	 protocols	 like	 the	 Heartbeat	
protocol.	
	
Detecting the Heartbleed bug using MT 
To	 identify	MRs	 to	 test	 implementations	 of	 the	 Heartbeat	 protocol	 messages	 (Figure	 5),	 the	 tester	 will	
typically	ask,	 “What	 if	 I	 change	some	of	 the	parameter	values?”	Suppose	 that	 the	source	 test	 case	 is	 t	 =	











combinations,	 leading	 to	 negative	 testing.	 For	 example,	 question	 2	 should	 stimulate	 thoughts	 that	
payload_length	might	not	necessarily	equal		payload,	and	prompt	the	construction	of	a	follow-up	test	case	tʹ	that	
increases	 the	 value	 of	 payload_length	 while	 keeping	 the	 other	 parameters	 unchanged.	 The	MR	will	 require	
different	behavior	for	t	and	tʹ	(per	RFC	6520):	the	PUT	should	return	a	normal	message	for	t,	but	discard	tʹ.	
When	 the	Heartbleed	 bug	 is	 tested	 against	 this	MR,	 it	will	 have	 the	 same	behavior	 for	 both	 t	 and	 tʹ	 by	
always	returning	a	message	(buffer),	which	will	violate	the	MR,	hence	revealing	a	failure.	
The	Heartbleed	bug	could	also	be	detected	by	using	a	fuzzer	in	conjunction	with	some	dynamic	analysis	
tools	 performing	 run-time	monitoring.	 However,	 these	 tools	 are	 restricted	 to	 predefined	memory	 error	
types,[1]	giving	MT	a	distinct	advantage	in	negative	testing	because	MT	can	detect	system	crashes	(in	which	
MRs	will	 always	be	violated)	and	other	error	 types,	 such	as	 incorrect	or	 inconsistent	behavior	 caused	by	
logic	errors.	





of	Web	 pages	 containing	 either	 the	 string	GLIF	 or	 the	 string	 5Y4W	 should	 be	 no	 less	 than	 11,783.	When	
generating	 this	 incorrect	 result,	 the	 search	 engine	 did	 not	 crash.	 The	 failure,	 therefore,	 could	 not	 be	





bugs	 that	other	 testing	methods	 failed	to	detect,	not	only	because	MT	 is	possible	without	an	oracle,	but	
also	 because	MT	 is	 based	 on	 a	 perspective	 that	 conventional	 testing	 techniques	 do	 not	 use.	MT	 is	 not	
necessarily	 always	 better	 than	 other	 testing	methods,	 but	 it	 does	 show	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 conducting	
testing	from	diverse	perspectives—thus	mirroring	the	diversity	of	programming	mistakes.	






underlying	principle—from	the	selection	of	 testing	and	analysis	methods,	 to	 the	 formulation	of	 test-case	






	 9.	 Z.Q.	 Zhou,	 S.	 Xiang,	 and	 T.Y.	 Chen,	 “Metamorphic	 Testing	 for	 Software	 Quality	 Assessment:	 A	 Study	 of	 Search	 Engines,”	 IEEE	 Trans.	
Software	Eng.,	vol.	42,	no.	3,	2016,	pp.	264−284.	






















	 6.	 T.Y.	Chen,	T.H.	Tse,	and	Z.	 Zhou,	 “Fault-Based	Testing	 in	 the	Absence	of	an	Oracle,”	Proc.	25th	Ann.	 IEEE	 Int’l	Computer	Software	and	
Applications	Conf.	(COMPSAC	01),	2001,	pp.	172–178.	
	
Tsong Yueh Chen is a professor of software engineering at Swinburne University of Technology, Australia. His main research 
interest is in software testing. Chen received his PhD from the University of Melbourne. He is a Senior Member of IEEE. Contact 
him at tychen@swin.edu.au. 
Fei-Ching Kuo is a senior lecturer at Swinburne University of Technology, Australia. Her current research interests include software 
analysis, testing, debugging, and repair. Kuo received the PhD degree from Swinburne. She is a member of the IEEE. Contact 
her at dkuo@swin.edu.au. 
Wenjuan Ma is an MPhil student in the School of Computing and Information Technology at the University of Wollongong (UoW). 
Her research interests include software testing and analysis. Ma received a BS in management from Beijing University of 
Chemical Technology. Contact her at wm230@uowmail.edu.au. 
Willy Susilo is a professor in and head of the School of Computing and Information Technology at the UoW. His research interests 
include cryptography and network and cyber security. Susilo received a PhD in computer science with an emphasis on 
cryptography from UoW. He is a Senior Member of IEEE. Contact him at wsusilo@uow.edu.au. 
Dave Towey is an assistant professor in the School of Computer Science at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China. His 
research interests include software testing, computer security, and technology-enhanced education. Towey received a PhD in 
computer science from the University of Hong Kong. He is a member of IEEE and ACM. Contact him at 
dave.towey@nottingham.edu.cn. 
Jeffrey Voas is a computer scientist at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology. His research interests include the 
Internet of Things and fundamental computer science shortcomings. Voas received a PhD in computer science from the College 
of William and Mary. He is a contributing editor for Computer’s Security column and a Fellow of IEEE and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Contact him at j.voas@ieee.org. 
Zhi Quan Zhou is a senior lecturer in software engineering at UoW. His research interests include software testing and debugging, 
security testing, and citation analysis. Zhou received a PhD in software engineering from the University of Hong Kong. Zhou is 
the corresponding author for this article. Contact him at zhiquan@uow.edu.au. 
 
